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HETEROSEXUALITY AND MILITARY SERVICE 
Zachary A. Kramer* 
INTRODUCTION 
The Kentucky National Guard‘s 940th Military Police Company is 
based in Walton, Kentucky, just south of the Kentucky-Ohio border.1  In 
November 2004, in anticipation of its deployment to Iraq, the 940th was 
mobilized and stationed at Fort Dix, New Jersey.2  Love was in the air at 
Fort Dix that fall.  While the 940th was preparing for its year of service in 
Iraq, five couples in the unit got married.3  Amanda and Todd McCormick 
were one of those couples.4  The McCormicks spent their first year of mar-
riage in an active war zone, where their duties included training the Iraqi 
police force, providing base security, and guarding detainees for the Army.5  
And they did all this without being able to kiss, hold hands, or even be 
alone together in the same room. 
Shortly before the unit shipped out to Iraq, the commander of the 940th 
issued a new policy for the unit.  Concerned that sexual relationships would 
interfere with the work to be done in Iraq, the commander decided to prohi-
bit the members of the 940th from having sex.6  Under the unit‘s new ―no 
contact‖ policy, members of the 940th could not engage in ―sexual contact, 
hand holding or kissing‖ while the unit was deployed to Iraq.7  For the 
McCormicks and the four other dual-serving couples in the 940th, their 
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memo outlining the policy, although married couples in the unit could have 
sex on leave, they could not engage in sexual conduct of any kind during 
active deployment.8 
In the summer of 2005, about halfway through her year of service in 
Iraq, Amanda McCormick emailed her congressman to complain about her 
unit‘s no contact policy.9  In the email, she referred to an incident where 
Todd came to visit her in her living quarters while she was on a down day.10  
Although they were fully dressed and the lights in the room were on, a su-
perior discovered them together and told Todd to leave.11  The risks of vi-
olating the policy were substantial.  Simply for being alone together, the 
McCormicks could have lost rank, had their pay docked, or been put on re-
stricted duty.12  ―We are not allowed to live together.  We are not allowed to 
spend time alone together.  Basically, in a nutshell, we are not allowed to be 
married,‖13  McCormick wrote in the email.  All the couple wanted was 
some private time together.14  ―We are stationed on the same base, in the 
same unit.  Instead of that fact being comforting, it has made us sick with 
worry.‖15 
The McCormicks‘ experience in Iraq highlights an underappreciated, if 
not completely overlooked, fact about military life: the military regulates a 
considerable amount of heterosexual sex.  For the McCormicks and the rest 
of the 940th, the military completely banned engaging in any kind of sexual 
conduct while they were deployed to Iraq.  This is just one way in which 
the military regulates heterosexual sex.  As this Essay shows, the military‘s 
rules regulating sex come in various shapes and sizes, from blanket rules 
against sex altogether, like in the McCormicks‘ case, to criminal laws tar-
geting specific sexual acts and relationships, to a criminal penalty for be-
coming pregnant during active duty.  The goal of this Essay is to examine 
the implications of the military‘s regulation of heterosexual sex for its cur-
rent policy toward homosexuality—the ―Don‘t Ask, Don‘t Tell‖ policy 
(DADT).16  Heterosexuality is largely missing from the national debate over 
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open hostility toward the policy.17  Yet heterosexuality holds the key to un-
derstanding why DADT is based on a faulty premise. 
DADT is built around the idea that because gay sex disrupts unit cohe-
sion18—that is, because it prevents service members from forming the bonds 
of trust needed to succeed in combat—lesbians and gay men cannot be al-
lowed to serve openly in the military.19  The policy rests on the idea that gay 
sex is more harmful to military effectiveness than other kinds of sexual 
conduct.  Yet the military‘s various rules regulating heterosexual sex are al-
so aimed at protecting unit cohesion.  If the military regulates a considera-
ble amount of heterosexual conduct as a means to protect unit cohesion, 
why does DADT presume that gay sex poses a greater threat to unit cohe-
sion than heterosexual sex?  The military‘s existing policies regulating hete-
rosexual sex suggest that DADT‘s focus on homosexuality is misplaced.  
What the military thinks of as a problem with homosexuality is really a 
problem with sexual conduct in general. 
This Essay makes two distinct contributions to the scholarly literature.  
First, it provides a new way of approaching the issue of gay military ser-
vice.  To date, the issue of gay service has been debated primarily in terms 
of whether the presence of openly gay service members would hinder mili-
tary effectiveness.  Indeed, the bulk of scholarly writing on DADT ap-
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from this trend by steering the conversation away from sexual orientation—
and, in particular, homosexuality—and refocusing it on sexual conduct.  Af-
ter all, DADT is but one of the military‘s many sex regulations, most of 
which impose considerable restrictions on the sexual lives of service mem-
bers without regard to sexual orientation.  By viewing DADT through this 
broader lens, this Essay paves the way for a more meaningful conversation 
about the military‘s interest in regulating the sexual conduct of all the men 
and women serving in the armed forces, not just the ones who engage in 
same-sex sexual conduct. 
At the same time, this Essay also makes a stand-alone contribution to 
the growing field of what scholars are calling ―critical heterosexual studies‖ 
(CHS).21  CHS is part of a new generation of critical scholarship that studies 
insider identities, such as whiteness22 and masculinity.23  From a methodo-
logical standpoint, CHS offers a dual benefit: not only does it provide in-
sights into an identity that is largely taken for granted, but it also uses 
heterosexuality as a lens through which to reconsider the cultural— and in 
the case of DADT, legal—construction of homosexuality.  This Essay 
touches on both aspects of CHS.  Not only does the Essay document the ex-
tensive ways in which the military regulates heterosexual sex, but it then 
uses these regulations to show that DADT is based on a faulty understand-
ing of the relationship between sex and unit cohesion.  
This Essay proceeds in three parts.  Part I considers the relationship be-
tween homosexuality and military service, including a detailed account of 
DADT‘s discharge provisions.  Part II turns to the relationship between he-
terosexuality and military service, considering the different ways the mili-
tary regulates heterosexual sex.  Finally, Part III reconsiders DADT in light 
of the Essay‘s argument that sexual conduct, rather than homosexuality, 
poses the real threat to unit cohesion.  Specifically, the Essay makes two in-
terrelated proposals.  First, it proposes that the military should get out of the 
business of regulating sexual orientation altogether.  Second, it urges the 
military to reconsider its regime of sexual regulations.  Once the military 
has shifted its focus from sexual orientation to sexual conduct, the military 
should have an internal conversation about its existing regime of sex regula-
tions.  This would be a prospective conversation, designed to facilitate the 
transition from a regime that regulates both sexual orientation and sexual 
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conduct to a regime that regulates sexual conduct exclusively.  The purpose 
of such a discussion would be to provide the military an opportunity to 
reexamine the relationship between sex and unit cohesion and, to the extent 
the military deems it necessary, to develop a new regime of sex regulations 
that is tailored to its interest in regulating sexual conduct that disrupts unit 
cohesion.  
I. HOMOSEXUALITY AND MILITARY SERVICE 
The United States military has always regulated homosexuality in one 
form or another.  Lieutenant Gotthold Frederick Enslin was the first service 
member to be discharged from the U.S. military because of homosexuali-
ty.24  The year was 1778, and General George Washington signed the dis-
charge order while the Continental Army was camped at Valley Forge.25  At 
a court-martial presided over by Enslin‘s commanding officer, Lieutenant 
Colonel Aaron Burr, Enslin was convicted of engaging in sodomy with a 
male private, in violation of the Articles of War of 1775.26  Washington‘s 
discharge order called for Enslin ―‗to be drummed out of the Camp tomor-
row morning by all the Drummers and Fifers in the Army never to re-
turn.‘‖27  The discharge ceremony, a bizarre affair by current standards, 
went off without a hitch.  After an officer‘s sword was broken in half over 
his head, Enslin followed the road out of Valley Forge while the drummers 
literally drummed him out of the Army.28 
These days, lesbians and gay men are not drummed out of the military 
but rather administratively discharged under DADT.  DADT is the latest in 
a series of U.S. military policies aimed at homosexuality,29 a history that 
dates back to Lt. Enslin‘s discharge for sodomy in 1778.  Rather than re-
construct this history in its entirety, this Part instead offers a detailed ac-
count of DADT‘s discharge provisions and its unit cohesion rationale.  
Such a detailed account is necessary in this case, as the goal of this Part is 
to provide a thorough description of the military‘s legal regime for regulat-
ing homosexuality.  To put DADT in its proper historical and political con-
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A. The 1981 Policy 
When President Clinton took office in 1993, he inherited a military 
policy that had been in place since the final days of the Carter administra-
tion.30  President Carter had vowed to ―get tough on gays,‖ and one week 
before Carter left office, Carter‘s deputy secretary of defense pushed 
through a service-wide ban on gay service.31  The heart of the policy was 
the claim that ―[h]omosexuality is incompatible with military service.‖32  To 
elaborate on this claim, the 1981 policy listed reasons why lesbians and gay 
men could not serve in the military, citing concerns about the effect of gay 
service on heterosexual service members‘ privacy, the military‘s recruit-
ment effort, the public image of the military, and possible security breaches 
(presumably on the theory that enemies of the United States could use a 
closeted service member‘s homosexuality as a basis for blackmail).33  Un-
like earlier policies, the 1981 policy denied unit commanders the discretion 
to determine whether a particular service member should be discharged be-
cause of homosexuality.34 
While campaigning during the 1992 presidential election, then-
Governor Clinton pledged that, if elected, he would repeal the 1981 Poli-
cy.35  Initially, President Clinton assumed that he could integrate the mili-
tary by executive order, just as President Truman had done in 1948 with 
Executive Order 9981.36  But once in office, President Clinton stumbled.  
Almost immediately, his proposal met strong opposition from the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff and Senator Sam Nunn, a conservative Democrat from 
Georgia, who—in his capacity as chairman of the Senate Armed Services 
Committee—organized congressional hearings on the issue of gay military 
service.37  General Colin Powell, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, figured 
prominently in the debate over gay service.  Not only did he testify in sup-
port of the gay ban at Senator Nunn‘s congressional hearings, but he also 
used the media to garner support for his position.  In what could have been 
seen as an act of insubordination, Powell told reporters that, ―the military 
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and the senior commanders—continue to believe strongly that the presence 
of homosexuals within the armed forces would be prejudicial to good order 
and discipline.  And we continue to hold that view.‖38 
 Once it became clear that he lacked the political capital to make good 
on his promise to completely repeal the 1981 policy, President Clinton sof-
tened his stance on gay service by putting his support behind a compromise 
policy proposed by Professor Charles Moskos, a military sociologist and 
close friend of Senator Nunn.39  The thrust of the compromise policy—
which ultimately became DADT—was to permit lesbians and gay men to 
serve in the military so long as they concealed their homosexuality.40  
DADT was an improvement on the 1981 policy, the Clinton administration 
insisted, because it targeted gay conduct rather than gay status.  Secretary of 
Defense Lee Aspin highlighted the shift from status to conduct in his testi-
mony before the Senate Armed Services Committee: ―Under the new poli-
cy, homosexual conduct will continue to be grounds for discharge from mil-
military service.  On the other hand, sexual orientation is considered to be a 
personal and private matter.‖41 
B. DADT 
DADT is built around the idea that homosexual conduct disrupts unit 
cohesion.42  According to the policy, unit cohesion refers to ―the bonds of 
trust among individual service members that make the combat effectiveness 
of a military unit greater than the sum of the combat effectiveness of the in-
dividual unit members.‖43  There are two dimensions to unit cohesion.44  
The first, what psychologists call ―task cohesion,‖ refers to the shared 
commitment of a group to accomplish a specific objective.45  In the military 
setting, task cohesion is directly related to the military‘s system of rank and 
hierarchy, in which orders flow according to a top-down, binding struc-
ture.46  Although service members must accomplish many objectives, both 
large and small, during their military service, DADT explicitly states that 
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should the need arise.‖47  The second dimension of unit cohesion is what 
psychologists call ―social cohesion.‖48  Social cohesion refers to the ―nature 
and quality of the emotional bonds within a group—the degree to which 
members spend time together, like each other, and feel close.‖49  The theory 
behind social cohesion is that groups that get along well perform better than 
groups that do not. 
With unit cohesion as the backdrop, DADT articulates three grounds 
for discharging lesbian and gay service members on the basis of homosex-
uality: acts, statements, and same-sex marriage.  This section considers each 
of these grounds for discharge in turn.  The section concludes with a brief 
discussion of DADT‘s ―queen for a day‖ defense, which gives service 
members an opportunity to avoid discharge by presenting evidence of hete-
rosexuality. 
1. Homosexual Acts 
The first ground for discharge under DADT is triggered when a service 
member engages in a ―homosexual act,‖50 which the policy defines as ―any 
bodily contact, actively undertaken or passively permitted, between mem-
bers of the same sex for the purpose of satisfying sexual desires.‖51  Note 
how broad this definition is.  Not only does the homosexual act provision 
reach conduct that is obviously sexual in nature, such as kissing or engaging 
in oral sex, but it also captures conduct that is less overtly sexual in nature.  
For instance, in a training manual accompanying DADT, the Department of 
Defense poses a hypothetical scenario whereby hand-holding constitutes a 
homosexual act under DADT.52  Hypothetical Teaching Scenario 2 involves 
two male service members who are seen walking in a public park and hold-
ing hands while both are off-duty and on liberty.53  The manual concludes, 
without elaboration, that ―hand-holding in these circumstances indicates a 
homosexual act.‖54 
Not all conduct involving homosexuality falls under DADT‘s homo-
sexual act provision, however.  The Department of Defense training manual 
also provides hypothetical teaching scenarios in which service members do 
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involves a service member who has been seen entering, leaving, and other-
wise hanging around a local gay bar.55  Similarly, Hypothetical Teaching 
Scenario 7 involves a service member who attends ―military night‖ at a lo-
cal gay bar.56  And Hypothetical Teaching Scenario 6 involves a service 
member who is seen marching in a gay rights parade, carrying a handmade 
placard with the words ―Lesbians in the military say, ‗Lift the Ban!‘‖ writ-
ten on it.57  None of these examples, the manual concludes, would constitute 
a homosexual act under DADT.58 
  
2. Homosexual Statements 
Lesbian and gay service members can be discharged not only for what 
they do, but also for what they say.  The second ground for discharge at-
taches when a service member ―has stated that he or she is a homosexual or 
bisexual, or words to that effect.‖59  On its face, the homosexual statements 
provision seems inconsistent with DADT‘s overall goal of focusing on gay 
conduct rather than status.  From the military‘s point of view, however, the 
statement ―I am gay‖ is not merely a declaration of a service member‘s ho-
mosexuality, but rather evidence that the service member will engage in 
prohibited conduct.  According to a Department of Defense directive that 
outlines separation procedures under DADT, a homosexual statement 
―create[s] a rebuttable presumption that the Service member engages in, at-
tempts to engage in, has a propensity to engage in, or intends to engage in 
homosexual acts ―60  The directive goes on to explain that a propensity to 
engage in homosexual acts is ―more than an abstract preference or desire to 
engage in homosexual acts; it indicates a likelihood that a person engages in 
or will engage in homosexual acts.‖61  In this regard, DADT collapses the 
distinction between gay status and conduct.62  Moreover, it is worth noting 
that, on several occasions, this formulation of homosexual statements—not 
as speech per se but as evidence of prohibited conduct—has saved DADT 
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3. Same-Sex Marriage 
The final ground for discharge under DADT attaches when a service 
member either enters into or attempts to enter into a marriage with a person 
―of the same biological sex.‖64  Back when DADT became law in 1993, 
same-sex marriages were not recognized in any state.  This was the case un-
til 2004, when Massachusetts became the first state to permit same-sex 
couples to marry.65  Since then, four other states have made marriage avail-
able to same-sex couples.66  DADT and related documents say next to noth-
ing about the same-sex marriage provision, except for a small note in the 
Department of Defense directive outlining administrative procedures under 
DADT, which addresses how to determine a person‘s biological sex for 
purposes of the marriage provision.  According to the directive, biological 
sex is ―evidenced by the external anatomy of the persons involved.‖67  Be-
cause most states do not yet recognize same-sex marriage, of the three 
grounds for discharge under DADT, the same-sex marriage provision has 
the least burdensome effect on the day-to-day lives of lesbian and gay ser-
vice members. 
  
C. “Queen for a Day” 
Even if a service member has violated DADT, the service member can 
still avoid discharge by proving that, regardless of whatever he did or said, 
he was only a ―queen for a day.‖68  The queen for a day defense provides a 
safety valve for service members who identify as heterosexual but engage 
in an isolated act that violates DADT.  In cases involving discharge for ho-
mosexual conduct, a service member can avoid discharge by showing that 
such conduct was a departure from the member‘s customary behavior and, 





  10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(3) (2006). 
65
  Massachusetts took this step in response to two decisions of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court, which, taken together, concluded that the state constitution compels marriage equality for differ-
ent-sex and same-sex couples.  See Goodridge v. Dep‘t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); 
Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (2004). 
66
  These states are Connecticut, Iowa, Vermont, and New Hampshire.  Varnum v. Brien, 763 
N.W.2d 862, 907 (Iowa 2009); Kerrigan v. Comm. of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 481 (Conn. 2008); 
Abby Goodnough, New Hampshire Legalizes Same-Sex Marriage, NYTIMES.COM, June 3, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/04/us/04marriage.html (link); Abby Goodnough, With Victories, Gay 
Rights Groups Expand Marriage Push, NYTIMES.COM, Apr. 7, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/08/us/08webvermont.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print (link).  
67
  DEP‘T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION NO. 1332.14, ENLISTED ADMINISTRATIVE SEPARATIONS 19 (Aug. 
28, 2008), http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/133214p.pdf (link). 
68
  See Mary Anne Case, Of “This” and “That” in Lawrence v. Texas, 55 SUP. CT. REV. 75, 90 n.66 
(2003) (describing the queen for a day exception) (link); Kenji Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract of Bi-
sexual Erasure, 52 STAN. L. REV. 353, 376–77 (2000) (same) (link).  
69
  10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(1)(A)–(E) (link).  The provision requires the service member to demonstrate 
that: 
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sexual statement, a service member can avoid discharge by proving that, re-
gardless of whatever statements to the contrary, the member does not en-
gage in homosexual acts.70  In effect, the queen for a day defense requires 
service members to prove that they are heterosexual, which of course is ex-
ceptionally hard, if not impossible, to do once there is credible evidence 
that a service member has engaged in homosexual conduct or made a ho-
mosexual statement.  For this reason, the queen for a day defense affords 
lesbian and gay service members limited protection against discharge. 
II. HETEROSEXUALITY AND MILITARY SERVICE 
When Brandon McNeese, the commander of the 940th Military Police 
Company, issued the no contact order for his unit, he was worried that sex 
would interfere with the 940th's mission in Iraq.  ―Sexual relationships be-
tween soldiers in a unit,‖ McNeese explained in a memo announcing the 
policy, ―have the potential to negatively affect morale, readiness and the 
good order and discipline of a unit during a deployment.‖71  For McNeese, 
the risks associated with having sex during deployment must have out-
weighed the potential benefits, which is why he refused to make an excep-
tion for the five married couples in the unit, including the newly married 
and newly deployed Amanda and Todd McCormick.72  The McCormicks 
soon found themselves in a situation familiar to most lesbian and gay ser-
vice members—they could not hold hands, kiss, or be alone together in the 
same room, let alone have sex.73  Even the most routine acts of intimate 
conduct—such as a committed couple sharing a quiet moment alone—
posed an unnecessary threat to unit cohesion under the unit‘s no contact 
policy. 
For the McCormicks and the rest of the 940th, the military imposed a 
complete ban on heterosexual conduct.74  In other situations, by contrast, the 
military regulates specific heterosexual acts, such as oral and anal sex.  
There are also situations where the military regulates specific heterosexual 
relationships, such as adulterous relationships and sexual relationships be-
                                                                                                                           
(A) such conduct is a departure from the member‘s usual and customary behavior; 
(B) such conduct, under all the circumstances, is unlikely to recur; 
(C) such conduct was not accomplished by use of force, coercion, or intimidation; 
(D) under the particular circumstances of the case, the member‘s continued presence in the armed 
forces is consistent with the interests of the armed forces in proper discipline, good order, and morale; 
and 
(E) the member does not have a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts.  
 Id. 
70
  Id. § 654(b)(2) (allowing the member to demonstrate that ―he or she is not a person who engages 
in, attempts to engage in, has a propensity to engage in, or intends to engage in homosexual acts‖). 
71
  See Honeycutt-Spears, supra note 2. 
72
  See supra notes 1–8 and accompanying text. 
73
  Id. 
74
  Id. 
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tween officers and enlisted service members.  Although they take different 
forms, these heterosexuality regulations share an important thing in com-
mon with DADT: they are designed to protect unit cohesion.  This raises a 
question about DADT‘s fundamental premise.  DADT rests on the idea that 
gay sex is more harmful to unit cohesion than other forms of sexual con-
duct, most notably heterosexual conduct.  But if the military regulates a 
wide range of heterosexual conduct, and it does so in the interest of protect-
ing unit cohesion, why does DADT presume that gay sex is more proble-
matic than heterosexual sex?  This Part argues that DADT‘s fundamental 
premise is faulty.  The military does not have a problem with homosexuali-
ty so much as it has a problem with sexual conduct. 
A. Regulating Heterosexuality 
This section considers the different ways in which the military regu-
lates heterosexual conduct.  These regulations come in four basic forms.  
The first is the military‘s criminal sodomy law, which targets specific sex-
ual acts.  The second form of regulation involves laws that prohibit specific 
sexual relationships.  The third form imposes blanket rules against sexual 
conduct, such as the no contact policy in the McCormicks‘ unit.  The fourth 
prohibits sexual encounters that result in pregnancy. 
1. Specific Sexual Acts 
As the statutory code governing all aspects of military life, the Uni-
form Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) includes a criminal prohibition 
against sodomy.  Article 125 of the UCMJ proscribes both oral and anal 
sex—as well as, rather curiously, bestiality.75  The provision does not take 
into account the service member‘s sex or the other party‘s military status, 
which means that the provision applies equally to men and women and that 
a service member cannot commit sodomy with either a fellow member of 
the service or a civilian.76  The maximum punishment for an act of garden-
variety sodomy is a dishonorable discharge and up to five years in prison.77  
In cases where the sodomy is either non-consensual or involves a minor (or 
both), the punishment can be as severe as a life sentence without the possi-
bility of parole.78 
In 2003, the Supreme Court held in Lawrence v. Texas that the Consti-
tution prohibited the states from criminalizing private, consensual sodomy.79  





  Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 925(a) (2006) (link); MANUAL FOR COURTS-
MARTIAL UNITED STATES, Part IV, Art. 125, ¶ 51 (2008 ed.) [hereinafter MANUAL FOR COURTS-
MARTIAL] (link). 
76
  See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, supra note 75, at Art. 125, ¶ 51(a).  
77
  Id. ¶ 51(e)(4).  
78
  See id. ¶ 51(e)(1)–(3). 
79
  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (link). 
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United States v. Marcum the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces con-
cluded that the military can continue to prosecute service members for en-
gaging in sodomy.80  According to the court in Marcum, even if a service 
member engages in sexual conduct that fits within the liberty interest rec-
ognized by the Lawrence Court, ―this right must be tempered in a military 
setting based on the mission of the military, the need for obedience of or-
ders, and civilian supremacy.‖81  In other words, after Lawrence, a service 
member‘s right to engage in sodomy is balanced against the military‘s in-
terest in maintaining good order and discipline among its ranks.  Lower 
courts have interpreted Marcum to require a case-by-case inquiry for prose-
cutions of sexual conduct in light of Lawrence.82 
2. Prohibited Relationships 
In addition to prohibiting specific sexual acts, the military also pro-
scribes two forms of sexual relationships—those involving adultery or fra-
ternization.83  Although neither of these is expressly mentioned in the 
UCMJ, the military prosecutes them under UCMJ General Article 134, 
which prohibits ―all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order 
and discipline in the armed forces, [and] all conduct of a nature to bring 
discredit upon the armed forces . . . .‖84 
Adultery.  Paragraph 62 of the Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM) im-
plicitly incorporates the adultery prohibition into Article 134 of the UCMJ 
by concluding that adultery ―is clearly unacceptable conduct, [which] re-
flects adversely on the service record of the military member.‖85  According 
to the MCM, a service member commits adultery by having sexual inter-
course with another person if, at the time of the sexual act, either the service 
member or the sexual partner is married to someone else.86  In addition, for 
adulterous conduct to constitute a violation of the UCMJ‘s Article 134, the 
sex must be ―directly prejudicial to good order and discipline or service dis-
crediting.‖87  The maximum punishment for adultery under the MCM is a 





  60 M.J. 198, 200 (C.A.A.F. 2004). 
81
  Id. at 208 (quoting United States v. Brown, 45 M.J. 389, 397 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
82
  See United States v. Bart, 61 M.J. 578, 581 (C.M.A. 2005) (quoting United States v. Stirewalt, 60 
M.J. 297, 304 (C.A.A.F. 2004); see, e.g., id. at 582 (C.M.A. 2005) (holding that the ―direct and obvious 
impact‖ of the crimes of sodomy and adultery on ―the military interests of discipline and order‖ is ap-
parent where a sailor murdered his civilian wife to continue a romantic relationship with another service 
member). 
83
  MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, supra note 75, at Art. 134, ¶¶ 62, 83. 
84
  Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 934 (2006) (link). 
85
  MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, supra note 75, at Art. 134, ¶ 62(c)(1). 
86
  Id. ¶ 62(b)(1)–(2). 
87
  Id. ¶ 62(b)(3), (c)(2). 
88
  See id. ¶ 62(e). 
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It is worth noting that the military does indeed enforce its prohibition 
against adultery.  For example, First Lieutenant Kelly Flinn, the first female 
to pilot the B-52 bomber,89 was charged with adultery after she had an affair 
with a civilian man who was married to an airwoman at the same base.90  
Despite a stellar service record, Flinn ultimately resigned and accepted a 
general (as opposed to honorable) discharge in order to avoid a court-
martial.91  Similarly, four-star Army General Kevin Byrnes was relieved of 
his command of Fort Monroe because he had an extra-marital sexual rela-
tionship.92  The Army‘s decision to relieve Byrnes came just a few months 
before he was set to retire as head of the Army Training and Doctrine 
Command, the culmination of a thirty-six-year career in the Army, during 
which Byrnes also served as the director of Army staff in Washington, D.C. 
and as the commander of the First Cavalry Division.93  The military‘s adul-
tery prohibition applied even though Byrnes and his wife were separated at 
the time (and subsequently divorced)94 because the MCM notes that, for 
purposes of interpreting the adultery provision, ―[a] marriage exists until it 
is dissolved in accordance with the laws of a competent state or foreign ju-
risdiction.‖95  As with sodomy, military courts have concluded that Law-
rence v. Texas does not foreclose prosecutions for adultery under military 
law.96 
Fraternization.  Like adultery, the military prosecutes fraternization as 
a violation of the UCMJ‘s general Article 134, as incorporated by Para-
graph 83 of the MCM.97  In the military context, fraternization refers to an 
inappropriate relationship between an officer and an enlisted service mem-





  Nancy Gibbs, Wings of Desire, TIME.COM, June 24, 2001, 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,137779,00.html (link). 
90
  See Elaine Sciolino, From a Love Affair to a Court-Martial, NYTIMES.COM, May 11, 1997, 
http://www.nytimes.com/books/97/12/14/home/airwoman-court-martial.html. 
91
  See Elaine Sciolino, For Dishonorable Discharge, B-52 Pilot Will Resign and Avoid Court-
Martial, NYTIMES.COM, May 18, 1997, http://www.nytimes.com/books/97/12/14/home/051897airforce-
pilot.html. 
92
  See David S. Cloud, Adultery Inquiry Costs General His Command, NYTIMES.COM, Aug. 11, 
2005, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/11/politics/11general.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=kevin%20byrnes%20ad
ultery&st=cse (link); Josh White, 4-Star General Relieved of Duty: Rare Move Follows Allegations of 
an Extramarital Affair, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Aug. 10, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/08/09/AR2005080900515.html (link). 
93
  See id. 
94
  See id. 
95
  MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, supra note 75, at Art. 134, ¶ 62(c)(3). 
96
  See United States v. Orellana, 62 M.J. 595, 598 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2005); United States v. 
Bart, 61 M.J. 578, 581 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2005); cf. United States v. Meredith, 2006 WL 1500001, at 
*1 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2006) (upholding an aviation instructor‘s conviction under the UCMJ for rape 
and adultery). 
97
  See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, supra note 75, at Art. 134, ¶ 83. 
98
  Id. ¶ 83(b)–(c). 
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sexual in nature; other examples of fraternization include gambling, lending 
money, sharing a living space, and engaging in a business venture.99  The 
justification for prohibiting fraternization is that unprofessional relation-
ships—including sexual relationships—are prejudicial to good order and 
discipline.100  The maximum punishment for committing fraternization is 
dismissal from the armed forces and up to two years in prison.101 
William Kite could have faced just such a prison sentence when the 
Air Force prosecuted him for fraternization in 1997.102  A Second Lieute-
nant in the Air Force, Kite was serving as the supervisor of security police 
for the 509th bomb wing at Whiteman Air Force Base when he fell in love 
with Rhonda Kutzer, an enlisted service member who worked as a security 
officer on the base.103  Although the couple planned on keeping their rela-
tionship a secret until Rhonda left the service, Kite‘s supervisors learned of 
the couple‘s relationship and approached him about it.104  Despite Kite‘s ini-
tial denials, an investigation turned up ample evidence of a sexual relation-
ship and Kite was charged with fraternization.105  Three days before Kite 
and Kutzer were married, Kite confessed and the Air Force added two 
counts of making false official statements.106  Neither the couple‘s marriage 
nor the fact that Kutzer voluntarily resigned from the service could save 
Kite from the fraternization prosecution.  Rather than risk a court-martial, 
Kite ultimately resigned and accepted a general (as opposed to honorable) 
discharge.107 
3. Blanket Rules 
The third type of military regulations on heterosexuality comes in the 
form of blanket rules.  Compared to the other regulations, the blanket rules 
impose the greatest restriction on heterosexual service members‘ sex lives.  
In this regard, the blanket rules are akin to the restrictions imposed by 
DADT on lesbian and gay service members.  Like DADT, the blanket rules 
prohibit intimate conduct that is overtly sexual, as well as conduct that is 





  See JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL‘S OFFICE, THE MILITARY COMMANDER AND THE LAW 239–40 
(2008). 
100
  Id. at 239. 
101
  See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, supra note 75, at Art. 134, ¶ 83(e). 
102
  See Elaine Sciolino, Courtship Leads to Marriage and Maybe Officer‟s Ouster, NYTIMES.COM, 
July 2, 1997, http://www.nytimes.com/1997/07/03/us/courtship-leads-to-marriage-and-maybe-officer-s-
ouster.html (link). 
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  Id. 
104
  Id. 
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  Id. 
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  Id. 
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  Linda Kramer, Another Fraternization Case: „You Can‟t Control Who You Fall In Love With,‟ 
ex-airman says, CNN.COM, Oct. 10, 1997, 
http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1997/10/10/widnall.kramer/frat.html (link). 
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unit cohesion, on the theory that sex—in particular here, heterosexual sex—
distracts service members from the unit‘s ultimate combat goals.  The prin-
cipal difference between the blanket rules and DADT is that, unlike lesbian 
and gay service members, heterosexual service members do not have to 
conceal their sexual orientation from their comrades.  After all, even under 
the strictest no contact policy, heterosexual service members can still talk 
openly about their heterosexuality.  Along the axis of sexual conduct, how-
ever, there is no real difference between a no contact policy and DADT, ex-
cept that the no contact policy effectively targets heterosexual conduct and 
DADT targets homosexual conduct. 
Unit commanders have the authority to issue blanket rules as they see 
fit, and with the military currently engaged in combat on multiple fronts, 
unit commanders have been turning to blanket rules as a means to maintain 
unit cohesion during deployment.108  Lieutenant Colonel David Poirier, 
commander of the 720th Military Police Battalion based at Fort Hood, Tex-
as, instituted a blanket rule against sexual conduct during his unit‘s dep-
loyment to Iraq.109  Like the policy in the McCormicks‘ unit,110 Poirier‘s no 
contact policy applied with equal force to single members of the unit and 
the unit‘s dual-serving married couples, all of whom were explicitly barred 
from engaging in any sexual conduct during their deployment.111  The no 
contact policy was necessary, Poirier explained, in part because ―you can‘t 
be ready for combat with your pants down.‖112 
 In April of 2008, Major General Jeffrey Schloesser, commander of the 
Army‘s Combined Joint Task Force-101 in Afghanistan, paved the way for 
service members stationed in Afghanistan to have sex.113  Schloesser did so 
by amending General Order No. 1, which outlines the standard of conduct 
for service members and civilians working for the military in Afghanis-
tan.114  The previous version of General Order No. 1 imposed a complete 
ban on ―intimate behavior‖ between men and women who were not married 
to each other and restricted unmarried men and women from entering each 
other‘s living quarters.115  Schloesser‘s amended version of General Order 





  Cf. Chuck Yarborough, Iraq No Honeymoon for Couples: Married Soldiers Struggle with Ban 
on Sexual Activity, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Feb. 25, 2004, at A2 (―[H]aving sex . . . is a violation of 
a battalion policy enacted halfway through the 720th Military Police Battalion‘s deployment to Iraq and 
could mean loss of rank or more.‖). 
109
  See id. 
110
  See supra notes 1–8 and accompanying text. 
111
  See Yarborough, supra note 108. 
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  Id. 
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  Drew Brown, Ban on Sex for Soldiers in Afghanistan Lifted . . . Sort Of, STRIPES.COM, May 14, 
2008, http://www.stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=54774 (link). 
114
  Id. 
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is ―highly discouraged.‖116  Sex in a combat zone, the amended order ex-
plained, ―can have an adverse impact on unit cohesion, morale, good order 
and discipline.‖117  The amended order did not, however, supplant existing 
sex regulations; service members could only engage in sexual conduct that 
was ―not otherwise prohibited‖ by the UCMJ.118  This meant that although 
men and women serving in Afghanistan could now have sex, they were still 
subject to the prohibitions against sodomy, adultery, and fraternization. 
4. Pregnancy 
For a short time last winter, in addition to regulating sexual conduct, 
the military also regulated pregnancy.  On November 4, 2009, Major Gen-
eral Anthony Cucolo III, a commander of U.S. forces in Northern Iraq, put 
into effect a policy that added pregnancy to the list of prohibitions for 
troops serving under his command.119  According to the policy, service 
members would be punished for ―becoming pregnant, or impregnating a 
soldier.‖120  The order imposed a criminal sanction, so service members who 
violated it would have faced a court-martial and possibly even jail time.121  
Army spokesperson Major Lee Peters explained that the goal of the order 
was to prevent service members from leaving their units shorthanded during 
deployment: ―When a soldier becomes pregnant or causes a soldier to be-
come pregnant through consensual activity, the redeployment of the preg-
nant soldier creates a void in the unit and has a negative impact on the 
unit‘s ability to accomplish its mission.  Another soldier must assume the 
pregnant soldier‘s responsibilities.‖122  Although General Cucolo couched 
the policy in terms of penalizing pregnancy, it was really an attempt to ban 
sex acts resulting in pregnancy, which of course only applies to procreative, 
heterosexual sex.  And like the no contact policy in the McCormicks‘ 
case,123 marriage was not a defense to General Cucolo‘s policy.124  In De-
cember 2009, General Cucolo softened his stance on pregnancy, explaining 
that, while he would still use nonjudicial punishments to enforce the order, 
there is ―absolutely no circumstance where [he] would punish a female sol-
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B. Sex and Unit Cohesion 
DADT is premised on the idea that homosexual sex poses a greater 
threat to unit cohesion than other kinds of sexual conduct.  But the hetero-
sexuality regulations discussed above suggest that DADT‘s unit cohesion 
rationale misses the larger picture.  Considering all the sex regulations the 
military has on its books, it would appear that the military does not have a 
problem with homosexuality so much as it has a problem with sexual con-
duct.  After all, the military‘s argument that the mere presence of openly 
gay service members in the armed forces poses a unique threat to unit cohe-
sion is doubtful when we consider the full extent to which the military regu-
lates heterosexual sex.  From the military‘s perspective, sex not only 
distracts service members from their ultimate goal of preparing for and ul-
timately fighting in combat, but it breeds disorder in the unit and, in the 
worst cases, puts lives at risk.  This explains why, for example, the 
McCormicks‘ unit commander thought it necessary to impose a complete 
ban on sexual conduct while his unit was deployed to Iraq.  And it also 
helps to explain the military‘s other restrictions on heterosexual sex, all of 
which seek to protect unit cohesion against the risks associated with having 
sex while serving in the armed forces. 
If the real threat to unit cohesion is sex, and not sexual orientation, then 
why does the military think that homosexuality poses a greater threat to unit 
cohesion than other sexual conduct?  The answer to this question lies in 
what I call the ―paradox of privilege.‖126  A framework for understanding 
the invisibility of heterosexuality in our culture, the paradox of privilege 
explains that heterosexuality is at once everywhere and nowhere—
everywhere because it is normative, yet nowhere because its normativity 
renders it invisible.127  Take the everywhere prong first.  As the normative 
standard for sexual orientation, heterosexuality is embedded in the fabric of 
our culture.128  Indeed, one of the primary lessons of modern feminist and 
queer theory is that the norms of heterosexuality affect nearly every aspect 
of our lives.129  Yet the normativity of heterosexuality also works to render 
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it invisible.  Because our culture is steeped in the norms of heterosexuality, 
heterosexuals tend not to think of themselves as having a sexual orienta-
tion.130  In this regard, heterosexuality is an example of what sociologists 
call an unmarked identity trait—that is, a socially generic or mundane trait 
that is largely taken for granted.131  Homosexuality, by contrast, is a marked 
identity trait—one that is highly articulated and exaggerated.132  Because it 
deviates from the heterosexual norm, homosexuality tends to receive ―dis-
proportionate attention relative to its size or frequency‖ in the population, 
whereas heterosexuality is largely taken for granted.133  Thus we can say 
that heterosexuality is nowhere, as it has ceased to exist apart from main-
stream cultural norms. 
Consider two examples of how the paradox of privilege works in prac-
tice.  To begin with, take the term ―sexual orientation.‖  By definition, sex-
ual orientation is a broad category, capturing a wide spectrum of sexual 
preferences and desires.  In practice, however, sexual orientation has come 
to be associated primarily with sexualities that deviate from the heterosex-
ual norm, such as homosexuality and, to a lesser extent, bisexuality.134  In-
deed, when people speak of sexual orientation these days, they almost 
always mean homosexuality.  After all, if people do not think of heterosex-
uals as having a sexual orientation, then the term sexual orientation effec-
tively becomes synonymous with homosexuality.  For instance, in my Law 
and Sexuality seminar I assign a casebook titled ―Sexual Orientation and 
the Law.‖135  Currently in its third edition, the casebook was originally pub-
lished under the name ―Lesbians, Gay Men, and the Law.‖136  Although it 
has been updated several times since its first publication in 1993, the title 
―Sexual Orientation and the Law‖ is inapt, as the casebook is almost entire-
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ly concerned with the legal regulation of homosexuality rather than the le-
gal regulation of sexual orientation in general.  That even experts in the 
field of law and sexuality use sexual orientation and homosexuality inter-
changeably suggests that the invisibility of heterosexuality is firmly embed-
ded in our culture. 
A second example of how the paradox of privilege works in practice is 
that we tend not to see heterosexuality.  In an earlier work, I gave an exam-
ple of two wedding announcements, laid out side-by-side, in the newspa-
per.137  The first announces the wedding of a same-sex couple, the second a 
different-sex couple.  Upon seeing the same-sex couple, the first thing that 
comes to a viewer‘s mind is that the couple is gay.  Because homosexuality 
is a marked identity trait, the gay couple‘s homosexuality stands out among 
the other wedding announcements on the page.  This is not the case with the 
different-sex couple.  Because we tend to take heterosexuality for granted, 
we see them as bride and groom, or husband and wife, or perhaps just as 
man and woman.  We do not, however, see their heterosexuality.  Obscured 
by the paradox of privilege, the couple‘s heterosexuality is hiding in plain 
view. 
The military is a particularly useful context in which to observe the 
dynamics of the paradox of privilege.  Under DADT, heterosexuality is 
more than just the cultural norm; it is the law.  By expressly codifying the 
presumption of heterosexuality, DADT mandates that all service members 
live a heterosexual lifestyle while they are in the military.  For lesbians and 
gay men, this means having to pass as straight while they are in the service.  
And because DADT applies to service members at all times, the require-
ment that they maintain a heterosexual identity is all-encompassing.  As 
Professor Tobias Wolff has argued, ―[b]y forbidding expressions of gay 
identity in any form, at any time, and with any individual—including a ser-
vicemember‘s family and friends—the policy compels servicemembers 
constantly and affirmatively to express a sexual identity of the military‘s 
choosing.‖138  It goes without saying that the military has chosen to compel 
heterosexuality among its ranks.  From the perspective of the paradox of 
privilege, then, heterosexuality is quite literally everywhere in the military. 
Yet in its pursuit of heterosexuality,139 the military also renders hetero-
sexuality invisible.  By compelling all service members to live a heterosex-





  See Kramer, supra note 126, at 228. 
138
  Tobias Barrington Wolff, Compelled Affirmation, Free Speech, and the U.S. Military‟s Don‟t 
Ask, Don‟t Tell Policy, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 1141, 1192 (1997). 
139
  In a classic article, Professor Ken Karst argues that the military‘s discriminatory practices—
whether aimed at race, sex, or sexual orientation—are all rooted in the military‘s pursuit of manhood.  
See Kenneth L. Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood and the Desegregation of the Armed Forces, 38 UCLA 
L. REV. 499 (1991).  Published in 1991, Karst‘s article predates DADT by a few years, though it is nev-
ertheless applicable to DADT.  The military‘s approach to sexual orientation is rooted in both its pursuit 
of manhood and its pursuit of heterosexuality. 
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW COLLOQUY  
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2010/11/ 361 
For if everyone serving in the military either is heterosexual or is passing as 
heterosexual, then heterosexuality ceases to exist apart from the military‘s 
work culture.  This helps to explain why the military views homosexual sex 
as posing a greater threat to unit cohesion than heterosexual sex.  Because 
expressions of homosexuality violate the military‘s heterosexual norm, ho-
mosexuality is marked as deviant behavior and is therefore thought to be 
especially harmful to military effectiveness.  By contrast, because it is taken 
for granted, heterosexuality escapes any sort of critical inquiry and is there-
fore presumed to have no effect on unit cohesion.  Thus, the paradox of pri-
vilege underlies DADT‘s faulty premise, obscuring the reality about sex 
and military life: that the military has a problem with sexual conduct, not 
sexual orientation. 
III. REFRAMING THE CONVERSATION 
Given that DADT is based on a faulty premise, it is time to rethink the 
policy.  DADT‘s opponents have long sought to overturn the policy by 
challenging the policy in court140 and by seeking repeal of the policy in 
Congress.141  The problem with these attempts to overturn the policy, how-
ever, is that they presuppose that lesbian and gay service members will be 
free from regulation once DADT is off the books.  Unfortunately, this is not 
the case.  The sexuality regulations discussed above—save perhaps for the 
pregnancy penalty—apply with equal force to heterosexual and homosexual 
sex.  This means that even after DADT has been overturned, lesbian and 
gay service members are still going to be subject to a wide range of restric-
tions on their sexual liberty, perhaps even to the extent of being barred 
completely from having sex while they are in the service.  Since the nation-
al conversation regarding sex and military life is almost entirely concerned 
with DADT, the goal of this final Part is to reframe the conversation.  Spe-
cifically, this Part argues that the proper way of thinking about the regula-
tion of sex and sexuality in military life is in terms of regulating sexual 
conduct, not sexual orientation. 
With that goal in mind, this Part makes two interrelated proposals.  
First, it is time for the military to get out of the business of regulating sex-
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conduct, the persistence of the prohibition against homosexual statements 
suggests that the military is still targeting gay status.  Thus it is time to reo-
rient DADT by eliminating the restrictions against homosexual statements 
and same-sex marriage.  Second, the military needs to reconsider its regime 
of sexual regulations.  This is not to say that the military necessarily needs 
to stop regulating sex altogether, but rather that the military needs to have 
an internal conversation about the extent to which it should be regulating 
service members‘ sexual lives.  Assuming the military is correct that sex 
does indeed pose a considerable threat to unit cohesion, then it should revi-
sit its rules regarding sexual conduct.  After having such a conversation, the 
military may decide to ban all sexual conduct during deployment, like the 
no contact rule in the McCormicks‘ unit, or perhaps to leave the existing 
regime of sexual regulations substantially intact.  However the military 
chooses to proceed, the important point is that the burden should be put on 
the military to think through the question of how it regulates service mem-
bers‘ sexual conduct. 
A. Reorienting DADT 
The Clinton administration grounded its support for DADT on the 
promise that DADT marked a shift in the military‘s policy toward homo-
sexuality.  While earlier policies were aimed at gay status, the Clinton ad-
ministration argued that gay conduct was the real threat to unit cohesion, 
and therefore DADT would target gay conduct rather than gay status.142  Yet 
DADT has not realized this promise.  By prohibiting homosexual state-
ments and same-sex marriage, DADT imposes a status-based regime on 
lesbian and gay service members.  In this regard, DADT is effectively no 
different than its predecessor policy—the 1981 policy—which was orga-
nized around the claim that ―[h]omosexuality is incompatible with military 
service.‖143  Although DADT does not endorse that view of homosexuality 
in theory, it does give effect to it in practice.  If lesbian and gay service 
members can be discharged solely for identifying as gay, then DADT‘s dis-
charge provisions sweep more broadly than the policy‘s stated goal, which 
is to exclude from the service those service members who, through their 
sexual conduct, disrupt unit cohesion.144  This is especially problematic giv-
en the nature of the military‘s other sexual regulations. 
When we consider the military‘s interest in unit cohesion, one thing 
becomes clear: DADT‘s homosexual statements and same-sex marriage 
provisions are out of step with the rest of the military‘s sexual regulations, 
which primarily target sexual conduct rather than service members‘ status.  
If DADT‘s stated goal is to target disruptive sexual conduct, and if the rest 
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should abandon its practice of regulating homosexual statements and same-
sex marriage.  Whether by repealing or not enforcing these provisions, the 
military should get out of the business of regulating sexual orientation.  
Doing so would accomplish two things.  First, it would satisfy the majority 
of DADT‘s critics, whose primary objection to DADT is that the policy 
does not allow lesbian and gay service members to serve openly.  With the 
homosexual statement and same-sex marriage provisions off the books, les-
bian and gay service members could serve openly but would still be subject 
to DADT‘s homosexual provisions.  Second, abandoning the homosexual 
statements and same-sex marriage provisions would recalibrate the mili-
tary‘s policy on homosexuality, bringing it in line with the rest of the mili-
tary‘s sexual regulations, which target sexual conduct rather than service 
members‘ status. 
B. Reconsidering Sex 
The second proposal is that, once the homosexual statements and 
same-sex marriage provisions are out of the picture, the military needs to 
reconsider its regime of sexual regulations.  The value of such a conversa-
tion is twofold.  First, it will allow the military as a whole to begin the 
process of shifting its focus from regulating homosexuality to regulating 
sexual conduct.  Second—and more importantly—it will give the military 
an opportunity to revisit and possibly modernize its regime of sexual regu-
lations.  As things stand currently, the military regulates sexual conduct 
through a hodgepodge of criminal laws (sodomy, adultery, fraternization) 
and local orders (no contact policy, pregnancy penalty).  After reconsider-
ing these policies, the military may decide that it needs to change the way it 
regulates sex.  Perhaps it will conclude that it would be best to ban all sex-
ual conduct while service members are deployed, or perhaps it will leave 
the rules substantially intact.  Moreover, it is important that the military use 
its own expertise to determine what restrictions on sex are necessary to pro-
tect unit cohesion.  The military, however, should have to articulate its rea-
sons for adopting any new regime of sexual regulations, if only because the 
imposition of such a burden on the military will help to facilitate a genuine 
deliberative process. 
When all is said and done, it is important to keep in mind that the mili-
tary is a workplace and that, like any employer, the military has an interest 
in regulating its employees‘ social conduct.  What sets the military apart 
from most workplaces, however, is that the military has completely col-
lapsed the distinction between service members‘ public and private lives.  
Service members live what organizational theorists refer to as fully inte-
grated lives, in that there is no meaningful distinction between a service 
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cording to military law, service members are always on the job, even when 
they are on temporary leave.146  And recruits are fully aware that the mili-
tary will restrict their liberty during their period of service.147  Thus it may 
well be reasonable for the military to regulate service members‘ sexual 
lives, and it should come as no surprise to service members when the mili-
tary does in fact seek to regulate their sexual conduct.  But the fact that the 
military has an interest in regulating service members‘ sexual conduct does 
not mean that the military should be able to impose sexual restrictions arbi-
trarily.  This is why the military should have to articulate its reasons for im-
posing restrictions on sexual conduct.  In the end, the goal is for the military 
to develop a sex policy that is specifically tailored to its ultimate goal of 
preparing for and ultimately succeeding in combat. 
C. A Concern 
Before concluding, it is necessary to respond to an anticipated concern 
about my argument thus far.  In recent years a group of scholars—whom I 
will refer to as sex positivists—have been developing a critique of the pre-
vailing view of sex in our culture.148  Although they approach the issue from 
different perspectives, the sex positivists all share the concern that the rising 
tide of sex negativity spells trouble not only for sexual minorities, who de-
viate from the heterosexual norm, but also for anyone who engages in what 
is seen to be a deviant sexual practice, such as voyeurs, transvestites, and 
people who practice sadomasochism.149  The goal of the sex positivists is to 
encourage a positive sexual ethic, one that celebrates, rather than sup-
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presses, people who resist the social pressure to conform to dominant sex-
ual norms.  Turning back to the military context, those who subscribe to the 
sex positivist ethic may view my argument as lending support to the domi-
nant—that is to say, deeply negative—view of sex and sexuality in our cul-
ture.  In particular, sex positivists may be troubled by my proposal for 
dealing with DADT, which leaves open the possibility of imposing a com-
plete ban on sex during active military service. 
This is indeed a legitimate concern.  My response is that, as discussed 
above, the military is a unique work environment and should be treated ac-
cordingly.  The military is not like a law firm, for instance.  From a 
workplace governance perspective, it is hard to imagine any reason why a 
law firm would feel the need to institute a no contact policy for its em-
ployees.  While it may consider imposing a rule forbidding employees from 
having sex with their fellow coworkers,150 or a rule targeting sex between 
employees in a supervisory relationship,151 the law firm does not have any 
reason to ban its employees from having sex altogether.  The military, by 
contrast, may be able to articulate a legitimate reason why it needs to im-
pose such severe restrictions on service members‘ sexual behavior.  Or it 
may not.  My point is merely that we should give the military an opportuni-
ty to have this conversation and see what comes out of it. 
CONCLUSION 
DADT is based on the idea that homosexual conduct poses a greater 
threat to unit cohesion than heterosexual conduct.  For this reason, under 
DADT, service members who engage in homosexual acts, make homosex-
ual statements, or enter into a same-sex marriages will be discharged from 
the service.  Yet DADT‘s unit cohesion rationale is doubtful in light of the 
many ways in which the military regulates sex without regard to sexual 
orientation.  As this Essay has argued, the military‘s focus on homosexuali-
ty is misplaced.  What the military regards as a problem with homosexuality 
is in fact a problem with sexual conduct.  Thus this Essay proposes that the 
military revisit DADT to make it more consistent with the military‘s over-
arching interest in regulating sexual conduct rather than sexual orientation.  
At the same time, this Essay seeks to initiate a broader conversation about 
the place of sex in military life.  If sex does indeed pose such a serious 
threat to unit cohesion, then the military should craft rules that are tailored 
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